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BANKRUPTCY FRAUD AND NONDISCHARGEABILITY
UNDER SECTION 523 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE




The most sweeping remedy available to a debtor in bank-
ruptcy is the discharge of the debtor's personal liability to his or
her creditors. A fundamental tenet of the Bankruptcy Code1 is
that the discharge of debts in bankruptcy is a remedy for the hon-
est but unfortunate debtor. Thus, a bankruptcy discharge is a form
of relief available only to those debtors who conduct themselves
with candor and honesty, both in their dealings with the Bank-
ruptcy Court, and with their creditors. Debtor fraud can take
many different forms and the Bankruptcy Code is endowed with
several provisions for dealing with such fraud.
The discharge of debts in bankruptcy envisions a trade-off; a
financially troubled debtor is relieved of his or her debt burden
through a discharge, and in return, the debtor is required to sur-
render certain assets to the control of the bankruptcy court. In
order to ensure that such assets are fully and fairly turned over for
the benefit of creditors, the Bankruptcy Code requires full disclo-
sure of the nature, location and disposition of all assets. Improper
efforts to conceal or destroy assets which might otherwise be avail-
able to creditors are repugnant to the very nature of the trade-off.
Typical remedies for such fraud are denial or revocation of the
discharge.2
* United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Minnesota. J.D., Order of the
Coif, 1967, University of Wisconsin Law School; B.A., 1964, University of Wisconsin. Judge
Dreher was appointed to the Bankruptcy Court in 1988. Prior to her appointment she
practiced law with the Minneapolis law firm of Leonard, Street & Deinard from 1968 to
1988, where she concentrated her practice in commercial and corporate litigation. She
served as Judicial Clerk to Chief Justice Robert Traynor of the California Supreme Court
from 1967 to 1968.
** Judicial Clerk to Honorable Nancy C. Dreher. J.D., cum laude, 1990, Tulane
University School of Law; B.A., 1987, University of Michigan. Mr. Roy has served as Judicial
Clerk to Judge Dreher since 1991. Prior to clerking for Judge Dreher, he served as Judicial
Clerk to Honorable Walter Shapero, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan from 1990 to 1991.
Segments of this article are reprinted, in pertinent part, with the permission of
Minnesota Continuing Legal Education.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 1141(dX3) (1988),
11 U.S.C. § 1228(d) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(e) (1988).
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Similarly, improper efforts to transfer assets to other entities
in order to avoid administration of such assets for the benefit of
creditors would be repugnant to the nature of the bankruptcy
trade-off. Such transfers often can be recovered and administered
for the benefit of creditors, 3 or can result in denial of discharge.
The discharge should not be used as a sword for dishonest
debtors to evade responsibility for debts incurred through fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation. While such fraudulently incurred
debts are not so severe as to merit a denial of the discharge alto-
gether, the debts themselves are generally nondischargeable
notwithstanding the fact that the debtor still receives a discharge
of his or her other debts.4
This article focuses on the treatment of fraudulently incurred
debts and the provisions of § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code5 as rem-
edies for such fraud. It will familiarize the reader with all aspects
of § 523 dischargeability proceedings, discuss the elements and
burdens of proof, set forth the distinctions between the various
subsections, highlight commonly seen cases, point out mistakes
which are often made and should be avoided, and provide sugges-
tions that should prove to be invaluable to presenting a winning
case. For reference purposes, the relevant Bankruptcy Code sec-
tions and Bankruptcy Rules are reproduced as an appendix to this
article.
II. APPLICABILITY OF § 523 TO THE VARIOUS CHAPTERS
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts a number of
debts from the effect of the discharge where debtor fraud is
involved. Such "nondischargeable" debts include: (1) debts
obtained by false pretenses, representations, or actual fraud; (2)
debts obtained through the use of falsely written financial state-
ments; (3) debts for fraud or defalcation where the debtor is a fidu-
ciary; and (4) debts for embezzlement or larceny.6
Since the remedy provided by § 523 excepts certain debts
from the bankruptcy discharge, it is axiomatic that the remedy
only applies in cases where a discharge of debts is available. Chap-
ters 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13 all contain provisions for discharging debts.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX4) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX6)
(1988).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XB) (1988), 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(aX4) (1988).
[Vol. 69:57
1993] BANKRUPTCY FRAUD & NONDISCHARGEABILITY 59
However, each chapter contains its own limitations on the types of
debtors entitled to the discharge, and the types of debts which are
dischargeable.
Section 7 2 7(aX) limits a discharge under Chapter 7 to indi-
vidual debtors; therefore, a corporation that files for protection
under Chapter 7 cannot receive a discharge. The Chapter 7 dis-
charge is expressly subject to all of the exceptions enumerated in
§ 523, thus debts for all of the aforementioned types of fraud are
nondischargeable.
The discharge granted to municipalities under § 944 of the
Code contains no exceptions for debts based on fraud.' Thus, a
§ 523 action cannot be maintained against a municipality dis-
charged under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a corporate debtor can receive a
discharge of all pre-confirmation debts, including debts for fraud,"
but an individual debtor's discharge does not extend to debts for
fraud.9 Therefore, a § 523 fraud action can be maintained against
an individual Chapter 11 debtor, but not a corporate Chapter 11
debtor.
In Chapter 12 and 13 cases, the debtor is granted a discharge
upon completion of plan payments. Under Chapter 12, an individ-
ual's discharge does not extend to debts for fraud, but in Chapter
13 cases, and corporate Chapter 12 cases, the discharge encom-
passes such debts.' 0 The debtor is also entitled to a "hardship dis-
charge" under either Chapter 12 or 13 in certain cases where the
debtor's inability to complete the plan is due to circumstances
beyond the debtor's control." Debts for fraud are excepted from
an individual's hardship discharge under both chapters.' 2 Thus, a
fraud dischargeabiity action can always be maintained against an
individual Chapter 12 debtor, but can only be maintained against
a Chapter 13 debtor where the discharge was granted based on
hardship rather than completion of a confirmed plan.
Counsel for both debtors and creditors must remain cognizant
of the chapter under which the debtor is proceeding, and the pre-
cise extent of the discharge afforded under that chapter. The costs
incurred in connection with commencing a dischargeability pro-
ceeding for fraud will be difficult to justify if the debtor is not enti-
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 944(b) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 9 4 4(c) (1988).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(dXl) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 1141(dX2) (1988).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(dX2).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1228(cX2) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 1328(cX2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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tied to a discharge or if debts for fraud are expressly included
within the discharge.
III. BASICS OF CONDUCTING A § 523 ACTION
Once the determination has been made that the debtor has
filed under a chapter of the Code that entitles it to a discharge,
and that such discharge does not extend to debts for fraud, 'counsel
for both debtors and creditors will need a full understanding of the
nature of dischargeability proceedings under § 523. Such pro-
ceedings are similar in nature to any federal civil proceedings gov-
erned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the
specific legal issues being litigated as well as many of the proce-
dural aspects of the proceedings are unique to bankruptcy; conse-
quently, a working knowledge of how to conduct dischargeability
proceedings is essential to success.
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Dischargeability proceedings are governed by Part VII of the
Bankruptcy Rules which incorporates most provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.1 3 A proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of a debt is commenced by the filing of an adver-
sary complaint. 14 The complaint is similar in nature to a civil com-
plaint filed in federal district court, and must be served upon the
defendant along with a summons.15 As in federal district court, all
allegations of fraud must be pled with particularity; general aver-
ments are insufficient. 6 An answer to the complaint is required,
and counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party pleadings are
allowed. 7 As in other federal civil proceedings, scheduling con-
ferences are routinely held; liberal discovery is allowed; relief can
be granted on default, on the pleadings, and on summary judg-
ment; and ultimately the matter is tried to judgment by the bank-
ruptcy court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 8
Familiarity with the Bankruptcy Rules, Federal Rules of Civil
13. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a), (e).
14. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007, 7003.
15. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
16. See FED. R. BANKE. P. 7009.
17. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7007, 7012, 7013, 7014.
18. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7016 (scheduling and pretrial conferences), 7026-37
(discovery rules), 7055 (default judgment), 7012 (judgment on the pleadings), 7056
(summary judgment), 9017 (applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence), 7052 (entry of
factual findings and legal conclusions), 7054 (entry of judgment).
[Vol. 69:57
1993] BANKRUPTCY FRAUD & NONDISCHARGEABILITY 61
Procedure, and Federal Rules of Evidence is fundamental to con-
ducting a dischargeability proceeding.
B. BURDEN OF COMMENCING THE ADVERSARY
PROCEEDING
Section 523(cXl) provides that debts incurred through fraud
are discharged unless the creditor files a dischargeability com-
plaint with the bankruptcy court. This provision places the bur-
den of filing a § 523 complaint alleging fraud on the creditor.'9
However, § 523(cX1) does not apply if the creditor had no
notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to fie
its complaint. 20 Therefore, if the creditor has no notice or actual
knowledge of the bankruptcy case, a debt for fraud is not dis-
charged merely because the creditor fails to file a complaint with
the bankruptcy court. This means that if a creditor without notice
or actual knowledge files a subsequent suit on the debt in state
court, it will not be prejudiced by its failure to file a dis-
chargeability complaint. Thus, in cases in which a creditor fails to
receive notice or actual knowledge of a bankruptcy case, the bur-
den of filing a dischargeability complaint for fraud is effectively
shifted onto the debtor since the debtor will need a determination
of dischargeability in order to avoid liability in the state court
proceeding.
This result clearly places a premium upon listing all creditors
with accurate addresses in the debtor's schedules. If the debtor
does so, he or she can rest assured that all creditors will receive
notice of the bankruptcy and that all § 523(cXl) debts will be dis-
charged unless a creditor specifically objects to the discharge of its
debt. If the debtor fails to list all creditors, he or she runs the risk
of having such debts determined to be nondischargeable in subse-
quent proceedings.
C. TIMELINESS OF THE COMPLAINT
The adversary complaint must be filed within sixty days of the
first date set for the § 341 creditors' meeting.2 Thus, if the credi-
tors' meeting is continued or if the date of the meeting is changed,
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(cXl) (Supp. III 1991).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 523(cXl).
21. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). This rule only applies in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
cases. No such deadline is normally set in Chapter 13 cases, since the Chapter 13 discharge
includes debts for fraud. However, if a debtor receives a Chapter 13 hardship discharge,
the court then sets a deadline for filing § 523 fraud complaints.
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the sixty-day deadline does not change. The deadline can only be
extended "for cause," and a motion requesting such an extension
must also be filed within the sixty-day period. 2
Failure to timely file either a complaint or a motion to extend
the deadline can be fatal to a plaintiff's case. If the debt is prop-
erly listed in the debtor's schedules in time to permit the creditor
to file a proof of claim and complaint within the sixty-day period,
the debt is discharged unless the creditor acts within such
period. 23 Even if the debt is not properly listed, the debt will be
discharged if the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy case in time to file a proof of claim and a dis-
chargeability complaint. 24
D. JOINDER OF NONDISCHARGEABILITY COUNTS FOR
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURIES
Section 523 contains a number of dischargeability provisions
which do not deal with fraud. Since the focus of this article is the
fraud remedies of § 523, discussion of non-fraud dischargeability
provisions might seem to be irrelevant. However, mention of the
willful and malicious injury provisions of § 523(aX6) is warranted
because counts under subsection (aX6) are frequently joined in
fraud dischargeability complaints. The elements of proof for these
types of counts are very different than those for fraud counts, but
counsel should be prepared to deal with both types of nondis-
chargeability counts since they are so often joined in one
complaint.2 5
E. JOINDER OF COUNTS RELATED TO DISCHARGEABILITY
By its very nature, a proceeding under § 523 is simply one to
determine whether a particular debt is dischargeable. However,
two questions closely related to the dischargeability of a debt can
arise in dischargeability proceedings: (1) whether the debtor
should be denied the protection of the discharge altogether; and
(2) what is the amount of the debt alleged to be nondischargeable?
Once again, understanding these related issues and knowing when
22. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
23. Bowen v. Residential Fin. Corp. (In re Bowen), 89 B.R. 800, 804-05 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1988); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(cXl) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX3XB) (1988).
24. Bowen, 89 B.R. at 804-05; see also 11 U.S.C. §523(cXl) (1988), 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(aX3XB) (1988).
25. Given the high frequency of subsection (aX6) counts being joined with subsection
(aX2) and (aX4) counts, the major issues arising in willful and malicious injury cases are
discussed in section VIII, infra.
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they should be coupled with a dischargeability count will be
instrumental in planning and conducting the dischargeability case.
In cases where a creditor wishes to object to the debtor's dis-
charge altogether under § 727 of the Code, rather than contesting
the dischargeability of a particular debt, the creditor should file an
adversary complaint similar to that filed in a dischargeability pro-
ceeding.26 Section 727 complaints are often combined with § 523
complaints, so that both the question of denial of the discharge and
the question of dischargeability of a debt can be before the court
in the same proceeding. The decision to combine such complaints
is not one that should be entered into lightly. Where a count
objecting to discharge is coupled with a count contesting the dis-
chargeability of a particular debt, the debtor will be under signifi-
cant pressure to settle with the complaining creditor, stipulating
to nondischargeability of the debt in order to avoid the possibility
of being denied a discharge altogether. In order to frustrate the
assertion of such leverage by creditors, Rule 7041 conditions vol-
untary dismissal of § 727 complaints on notice to the trustee and
United States Trustee. Additionally, many bankruptcy courts have
enacted local rules which further assure that voluntary dismissals
are not a result of undue leverage.
An additional consideration is whether denial of discharge is
more relief than any single creditor wants. Since a denial of dis-
charge allows all debts to survive bankruptcy, it may result in the
complaining creditor having to compete with other creditors for
the debtor's assets. Therefore, if a creditor has a strong case under
§ 523, joining a count under § 727 is often not in the creditor's best
interest.
Liquidation of the actual amount of the debtor's liability is
similarly a matter that creditors often join with their complaint to
determine the dischargeability of a debt. Given the large volume
of cases handled by bankruptcy courts, they are usually reluctant
to liquidate such debts. If the parties are already before the bank-
ruptcy court, however, it may be in the interest of judicial econ-
omy to liquidate the debt if the creditor has not yet obtained a
judgment elsewhere. Thus, while the issue of liquidation of debts
is usually referred back to the state courts, the bankruptcy court
will be more willing to liquidate claims where the facts necessary
to prove the debt are also necessary to determine its
26. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004.
27. See, e.g., LOCAL R. BANKR. P., D. Minn. 1110 (appended to this article).
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dischargeability. 8
Although the question litigated in dischargeability proceed-
ings is normally limited to the dischargeability of a debt, counsel
should be prepared to deal with the issues of denial of discharge
and debt liquidation. Properly identifying and distinguishing the
substantive issues that are-and are not-before the court saves
both time and money, and facilitates orderly disposition of the
case.
F. STANDARD OF PROOF
The standard of proof in dischargeability proceedings for
fraud 2 9 is the preponderance of the evidence standard. However,
counsel should be prepared to face different standards of proof in
cases where any of the matters discussed in sections D and E
above are joined with the fraud issues. The standard of proof, both
with respect to counts alleging nondischargeability based on will-
ful and malicious injuries and counts objecting to the discharge
altogether, are currently unresolved. 30
IV. DEBTS INCURRED THROUGH FALSE PRETENSES,
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OR ACTUAL FRAUD-§ 523(aX2XA)
Section 523(aX2XA) excepts from discharge any debt "for
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by--(A) false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting
the debtor's or an insider's financial condition .... 31
28. See In re Borbridge, 81 B.R. 332, 334-36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
29. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991).
30. In objections to discharge, a number of courts apply the clear and convincing
standard in § 727(aX2) cases, and the preponderance standard in § 727(aX4) cases based on
pre-Grogan law. See, e.g., In re Sanders, 128 B.R. 963, 967 & n.2 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1991).
The legislative history of the Code plainly states that the preponderance standard applies to
§ 727(aX4), but it is silent regarding the other subsections. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 384 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6340. S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5884. Subsequent to
Grogan, many courts are applying the preponderance standard to objections brought under
the other subsections as well, and are doing so based on reasoning analogous to that in
Grogan. See, e.g., In re Cook, 126 B.R. 261, 265 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
For a discussion of the standard of proof in willful and malicious injury dischargeabiity
cases, see section VIII(A), infra.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XA) (1988).
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A. ELEMENTS OF PROOF
The elements of proof for a case under § 523(aX2XA) are as
follows:
1. A false representation or pretense by the debtor;
2. The debtor knew the representation to be false at the
time, or acted with reckless disregard as to its
veracity;
3. The debtor intended to deceive the creditor or to
induce him to act upon the representation;
4. Actual reliance by the creditor;32 and
5. The creditor sustained the alleged loss and damage as
a proximate result of the representation.3 3
B. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
The creditor normally bears the burden of proving its case by
a preponderance of the evidence. 34 However, § 523(aX2XC) cre-
ates a presumption of nondischargeability in the cases of "luxury
goods" and "cash advances." The presumption arises in connec-
tion with two types of debts: (1) consumer debts incurred by an
individual debtor within forty days of the order for relief that are
owed to a single creditor and add up to more than $500 for "lux-
ury goods or services;" and (2) cash advances obtained by an indi-
vidual debtor within twenty days of the order for relief that
aggregate more than $1,000 and are "extensions of consumer
credit under an open ended credit plan."'3 5 The presumption is a
rebuttable one, and if the creditor establishes its applicability,36
32. Id. As discussed in section IV(E), infra, some courts require proof of reasonable
reliance, but this element of proof is not universally required.
33. In re Rubin, 875 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1989); Thul v. Ophaug (In re Ophaug), 827
F.2d 340, 342 n. 1(8th Cir. 1987); Alexander & Alexander of Washington, Inc. v. Hultquist
(In re Hultquist), 101 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); Interfinancial Corp. v. White (In
re White), 130 B.R. 979, 985 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991); Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc. v. Hinman
(In re Hinman), 120 B.R. 1018, 1021 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990); First Baptist Church v. Maurer
(In re Maurer), 112 B.R. 710,712-13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); City Fed. Sav. Bank v. Seaborne
(In re Seaborne), 106 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); Rowe v. Showalter (In re
Showalter), 86 B.R. 877, 880 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988); Scwalbe v. Gans (In re Gans), 75 B.R.
474, 482-83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re
Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 939 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); Fournet v. Miller (In re Miller), 5 B.R.
424, 428 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980).
34. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991); see also Page v. Racila (In re Racila),
138 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); Norwest Bank Iowa v. Larson (In re Larson), 136
B.R. 540, 543 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992); Key Bank v. Cifalia (In re Cifalia), 124 B.R. 124, 126
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); FDIC v. Smith (In re Smith), 133 B.R. 800, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1991);
Farina v. Balzano (In re Balzano), 127 B.R. 524, 530 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XC) (1988).
36. The elements of proof to establish the presumption have been outlined as follows:
(1) a consumer debt, (2) owed to a single creditor, (3) aggregating more than $500, (4) for
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the burden of going forward then shifts to the debtor to produce
evidence that the debt was not incurred through false pretenses,
false representations, or actual fraud.37 The ultimate burden of
persuasion, however, remains on the creditor.38
Subsection (aX2XC) provides no definition of luxury goods, but
does provide that luxury goods do not include "goods or services
reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor. ' 39  In determining whether
purchases constitute luxury goods, the courts universally hold that
the facts and circumstances surrounding the debtor's purchase
must be considered.4" Thus, one court considered an automobile
to be a luxury good in a case in which the debtor owned two other
cars, had incurred the debt to purchase the third one after meet-
ing with counsel to discuss bankruptcy, filed the bankruptcy peti-
tion ten days after incurring the debt, and made only one payment
on the loan.4 1  Other courts, however, have found that
automobiles are not luxury items when weight is given to the fol-
lowing factors: (1) the automobile is moderately priced12 or
used;4 3 (2) the automobile is necessary for the debtor's livelihood a4
or family travel needs;45 (3) the automobile is the debtor's only
car;46 and (4) the debtor traded in an old automobile for a new
one.
4 7
The "cash advance" presumption is applicable to debtor's who
"load up" their credit cards by taking cash advances shortly before
filing for bankruptcy. In explaining the presumption,
§ 523(aX2XC) refers to the Consumer Credit Protection Act.4"
"Consumer" credit under that Act refers to credit that is extended
luxury goods or services, (5) incurred by an individual debtor, (6) on or within 40 days
before the order for relief. Lorain County Bank v. Triplett (In re Triplett), 139 B.R. 687,
689-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (citing authorities); J.C. Penny Co. v. Leaird (In re Leaird),
106 B.R. 177, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1989).
37. Triplett, 139 B.R. at 689-90; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Faulk (In re Faulk), 69 B.R.
743, 751 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986). See First Security Bank v. Davis (In re Davis), 56 B.R. 120,
121 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1985).
38. Faulk, 69 B.R. at 752; Leaird, 106 B.R. at 179; Norwest Fin. Consumer Discount
Co. v. Koch (In re Koch), 83 B.R. 898, 902 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XC) (1988).
40. GMAC v. McDonald (In re McDonald), 129 B.R. 279, 282-83 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991); Faulk, 69 B.R. at 751; Davis, 56 B.R. at 121-22.
41. See Triplett, 139 B.R. at 690.
42. McDonald, 129 B.R. at 283.
43. Davis, 56 B.R. at 122.
44. McDonald, 129 B.R. at 283.
45. Davis, 56 B.R. at 121-22.
46. id.
47. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16 01-1 6 9 3(r) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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"primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."4 An
"open end credit plan" is one "under which the creditor reason-
ably contemplates repeated transactions, which prescribes the
terms of such transactions, and which provides for a finance
charge which may be computed from time to time on the out-
standing unpaid balance."50
Thus, while the creditor normally bears the burden of proof,
the initial burden of going forward can be shifted to the debtor in
cases involving consumer debtors that incur substantial debt
immediately prior to filing the petition. Counsel should be pre-
pared for such a shift in the burden, but should remain cognizant
that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the creditor.
C. OMISSIONS
The first element of proof under § 523(aX2XA) requires a false
representation or pretense by the debtor. Whether an omission, as
opposed to an overt representation, can constitute a representa-
tion for purposes of nondischargeability under § 523(aX2XA) is an
unresolved issue.
The courts holding that an omission is not sufficient under
§ 523(aX2XA) reason that the requirement of "actual or positive
fraud"5 " requires overt fraudulent representations.5 2 This ration-
ale follows from the common law principle that omissions do not
constitute fraudulent representations.53 However, where the
debtor is under a duty to disclose, these courts may be more will-
ing to find a debt nondischargeable.54 In Trizna & Lepri v. Mal-
colm (In re Malcolm),55 the court went so far as to find that such a
duty exists where the debtor knows that the circumstances imply
an incorrect material fact.56
The courts holding that omissions can be sufficient to result in
nondischargeability hold that such omissions can constitute false
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1988).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1988).
51. See discussion at section IV(D), infra.
52. See Schweig v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 780 F.2d 1577, 1580 (11 th Cir. 1986); Trizna
& Lepri v. Malcolm (In re Malcolm), 145 B.R. 259, 262-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); Key Bank
v. Cifalia (In re Cifalia), 124 B.R. 124, 126-27 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); Flint Area Sch.
Employee Credit Union v. Nogami (In re Nogami), 118 B.R. 846, 848 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990); Oppenheimer v. Reder (In re Reder), 60 B.R. 529, 535 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986);
Mercer v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 35 B.R. 224, 227 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); Boatmen's North
Hills Bank, Inc. v. Brewood (In re Brewood), 15 B.R. 211, 214 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
53. Malcolm, 145 B.R. at 262-63; Cifalia, 124 B.R. at 126.
54. See Cifalia, 124 B.R. at 126; Bailey, 35 B.R. at 227.
55. 145 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
56. See Trizna & Lepri v. Malcolm (In re Malcolm), 145 B.R. 259, 263 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1992).
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pretenses. While a number of courts boldly state that omissions
are sufficient under § 523(aX2XA) with little or no analysis,5" the
courts that have analyzed the issue generally hold that the omis-
sion can constitute a false pretense if the circumstances of the case
create a false impression, the true nature of which is known to the
debtor. 58 When comparing the holdings of these cases to that
described in the Malcolm case above, it can be seen that the line
between these two seemingly divergent positions is significantly
obscured.
The upshot of this conflicting case law is that counsel must be
familiar with the prevailing law in the forum where the case is
venued. Counsel should know whether the court recognizes omis-
sions under § 523(aX2XA) before a complaint is ever filed. If the
court does allow omissions, counsel should be prepared to prove
that the particular circumstances of the case created a false
impression of which the debtor was aware.
D. INTENT
The second and third elements of proof require a showing
that the debtor made the representation or pretense knowing it to
be false and intending to deceive the creditor or induce reliance.
These elements require a showing of actual or positive fraud by
the debtor in order to support a finding of nondischargeability
under § 523(aX2XA). Such fraud involves moral turpitude or inten-
tional wrongful acts. Constructive fraud, or fraud implied in law,
which can exist without any imputation of bad faith or immorality,
is insufficient.5 9  Rather, § 523(aX2XA) requires positive fraud
which encompasses deceit, artifice, trick, or design involving
active operation of. the intellect to mislead, circumvent or cheat a
57. See Caspers v. Van Home (In re Van Home), 823 F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987);
Interfinancial Corp. v. White (In re White), 130 B.R. 979, 985 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991);
McHenry v. Ward (In re Ward), 115 B.R. 532, 539 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Wheeling Wholesale
Grocery Co. v. Piccolomini (In re Piccolomini), 87 B.R. 385, 387 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988);
Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 939 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1981).
58. See Germain Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Begun (In re Begun), 136 B.R. 490, 494-95
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); Evans v. Dunston (In re Dunston), 117 B.R. 632, 640-41 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990); Cooke v. Howarter (In re Howarter), 95 B.R. 180, 187-88 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1989).
59. Schweig v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 780 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986); Driggs v.
Black (In re Black), 787 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1986); Thul v. Ophaug (In re Ophaug), 827
F.2d 340, 342 n. 1(8th Cir. 1987); Cladakis v. Triggiano (In re Triggiano), 132 B.R. 486, 490
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); Custer v. Dobbs (In re Dobbs), 115 B.R. 258, 265-66 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1990); First Baptist Church v. Maurer (In re Maurer), 112 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1990); Leeb v. Guy (In re Guy), 101 B.R. 961, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); Thorp Credit
& Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 939 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981);
Fournet v. Miller (In re Miller), 5 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980).
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creditor.6 °
The following cases are exemplary of the type of fraud con-
templated by § 523(aX2XA). In Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pom-
merer (In re Pommerer),6 1 a loan debt was found to be
nondischargeable because the debtor led the creditor to believe
that he owned certain livestock, intending to induce the creditor
to grant the loan in reliance on the false pretense.62 In Fournet v.
Miller (In re Miller),63 a debt owed by a remodelling contractor to
a homeowner was found to be nondischargeable because the con-
tractor induced payment by submitting invoices for amounts due
to suppliers with no intention of paying the amounts received to
such suppliers. 4 In City Federal Savings Bank v. Seaborne (In re
Seaborne),6" the court found a loan debt to be nondischargeable
because the debtor assigned leases to the creditor in order to
induce the creditor to make the loan, knowing that the parties to
66the leases had no intention of making payments under the leases.
In Caspers v. Van Home (In re Van Home),67 an extension of
credit was nondischargeable because the debtor failed to disclose
his intentions to divorce the creditor's daughter, intending to
deceive the creditor into extending the credit. 8
Although positive fraud is required, courts recognize that
direct evidence of positive fraud is seldom forthcoming since few
debtors will admit to intentionally deceiving their creditors.
Accordingly, the courts universally allow fraud to be proven by
circumstantial evidence.69 Positive fraud is diflicult to prove, and
circumstantial indicia are crucial. Witness credibility is a key fac-
tor in proving intent, so counsel should objectively weigh the cred-
ibility of his or her own witnesses against the opponent's.
60. Dobbs, 115 B.R. at 265-66; Guy, 101 B.R. at 978; Pommerer, 10 B.R. at 939.
61. 10 B.R. 935 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
62. Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 939-40
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
63. 5 B.R. 424 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980).
64. Fournet v. Miller (In re Miller), 5 B.R. 424, 428 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980).
65. 106 B.R. 711 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
66. City Fed. Say. Bank v. Seaborne (In re Seaborne), 106 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1989).
67. 823 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1987).
68. Caspers v. Van Horne (In re Van Horne), 823 F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987).
69. See id. at 1287; Trizna & Lepri v. Malcolm (In re Malcolm), 145 B.R. 259, 263-64
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); Interfinancial Corp. v. White (In re White), 130 B.R. 979,985 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1991); First Baptist Church v. Maurer (In re Maurer), 112 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1990); Leeb v. Guy (In re Guy), 101 B.R. 961, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); Wollman
v. Gessler (In re Gessler), 11 B.R. 489, 492 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); In re Pommerer, 10 B.R.
at 940.
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E. RELIANCE
The fourth element of proof requires a showing of reliance by
the creditor. Although courts universally hold that actual reliance
must be shown, there is a split of authority as to whether the credi-
tor must prove the additional element that its reliance upon the
representation was reasonable."0 This split is widened by the fact
that the courts requiring reasonable reliance are not in accord as
to the level of creditor reasonableness required.71
The courts finding that there is no requirement of reasonable-
ness generally cite the Eighth Circuit precedent of Thul v.
Ophaug (In re Ophaug),7 2 in which the court based its holding in
part on the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Connecticut in Mechanics & Farmers Savings Bank v. Fosco (In re
Fosco).73 This line of cases relies first on the "plain language rule"
of statutory construction. The courts hold that § 523(aX2XA) is
unambiguous and contains no express reasonableness require-
ment, and therefore one should not be judicially imposed absent a
clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary.74 Examining
the legislative history, the courts find no such expression of intent.
Upon close examination of the legislative history, the courts
following Ophaug and Fosco garnish more support for their view
that § 523(aX2XA) lacks a reasonableness requirement. 75 Subsec-
tion (aX2XB) contains an express requirement of reasonableness,
and the legislative history expresses clear policy reasons for requir-
ing reasonable reliance in (aX2XB) cases. The courts conclude that
these policy concerns are not present in subsection (aX2XA) cases,
justifying the lack of a reasonableness requirement therein.76
In addition to the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently weighed-in on this side of the dispute in
Allison v. Roberts (In re Allison).77 In Allison, the Fifth Circuit
held that reasonableness was not a requirement under
70. See infra notes 72-82.
71. See infra notes 83-85.
72. 827 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1987).
73. 14 B.R. 918 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). Accord Allison v. Roberts (In re Allison), 960
F.2d 481, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1992); Weeden v. Monahan (In re Monahan), 125 B.R. 697, 699
n.5 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1991); City Fed. Sav. Bank v. Seaborne (In re Seaborne), 106 B.R. 711,
714 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); Rowe v. Showalter (In re Showalter), 86 B.R. 877, 881 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1988).
74. See Thul v. Ophaug (In re Ophaug), 827 F.2d 340,342 (8th Cir. 1987); Showalter, 86
B.R. at 881; Seaborne, 106 B.R. at 714.
75. See note 73, infra.
76. See Ophaug, 827 F.2d at 343; Mechanics & Farmers Say. Bank v. Fosco (In re
Fosco), 14 B.R. 918, 921-22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); Showalter, 86 B.R. at 881-82.
77. 960 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1992).
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§ 523(aX2XA), but added that reasonableness of reliance can be
strong circumstantial evidence of actual reliance. 8
The courts on the other side of the split argue that a judicial
gloss requiring reasonable reliance had been placed on the precur-
sor to § 523(aX2), and that such gloss survived enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code.79 These courts rely on the principle of statu-
tory construction that Congress is deemed to enact legislation cog-
nizant of existing common law and should not be deemed to have
repealed such law absent a clear expression of intent to that
effect.8 0 The courts find further support for their position in argu-
ments of policy, reasoning that the requirement of reasonable reli-
ance places a measure of responsibility upon creditors.8 ' The
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, as well as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, all
require a creditor's reliance to be reasonable. 2
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals holds that the reasonable-
ness requirement is not a rigorous one requiring a searching
inquiry into a creditor's lending policies and practices.8 3 Rather, it
is a means of assuring that dischargeability is not denied in
instances where the creditor's reliance is "so unreasonable as to
negate any actual reliance. 8s4 Whether the reliance element is
similarly restricted in the Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
and by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, is currently
unclear, although at least one bankruptcy court in the Tenth Cir-
cuit has held that reliance is so restricted. 5
The practical implication of the split in case law is that counsel
must become familiar with the prevailing law in the district in
78. Allison v. Roberts (In re Allison), 960 F.2d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 1992).
79. See Coman v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 804 F.2d 930, 933 (6th Cir. 1986); BancBoston
Mortgage Corp. v. Ledford (In re Ledford), 970 F.2d 1556, 1559-60 (6th Cir. 1992); First
Bank v. Mullet (In re Mullet), 817 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir. 1987); Cooke v. Howarter (In re
Howarter), 114 B.R. 682, 685-86 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Kimzey
(In re Kimzey), 761 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing the pre-Code case of Carini v.
Matera, 592 F.2d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1979)).
80. Supra, note 79.
81. See Ledford, 970 F.2d at 1559-60; Mullet, 817 F.2d at 679.
82. See supra note 79. Given the Supreme Court's clear espousal of the "plain
meaning" rule in a litany of recent bankruptcy cases, the reasoning of the courts finding a
reasonableness requirement in subsection (aX2XA) is questionable. See Patterson v.
Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (1992); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146,
1149-50 (1992); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992); Union
Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527,530 (1991); Board of Governors v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
459, 466 (1991); United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1989). But see
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778-79 (1992) (finding the plain meaning rule
inapplicable based on a supposed ambiguity in the term "allowed secured claim").
83. Ledford, 970 F.2d at 1560.
84. Id.
85. Newsome v. Culp (In re Culp), 140 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992).
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which the dischargeability case is venued. In circuits where the
law is clear, counsel should be familiar with exactly what must be
proven, and in circuits where the requirement is either unclear or
unresolved, counsel must be prepared to argue the merits of the
reasonableness requirement as well.
F. CREDIT CARD CASES
Probably the most typical nondischargeability case brought
under subsection (aX2XA) is the so-called "credit card case." An
apparent majority of courts now hold that the purchase of goods
through use of a credit card constitutes an implied representation
that the debtor has both the means and intention to satisfy the
debt created thereby.8 6 Therefore, a debtor, who at the time a
credit card purchase is made, either knows that he is unable to
repay the debt or has no intention of doing so, obtains property
through a false representation. Certain factors have been identi-
fied as being indicative of the debtor's subjective intent: (1) the
length of time between the charges and the filing of the petition;
(2) whether an attorney was consulted regarding bankruptcy
before the charges were made; (3) the number of charges made;
(4) the amount of the charges; (5) the debtor's financial condition at
the time the charges were made; (6) whether the charges were
above the credit limit; (7) whether multiple charges were made on
the same day; (8) whether the debtor was employed at the time; (9)
the debtor's prospects for employment; (10) the financial sophisti-
cation of the debtor; (11) whether there was a sudden change in
buying habits; and (12) whether purchases were for luxuries or
necessities.8 7 These criteria are not exhaustive and not all of them
are adhered to by all courts. A lack or presence of particular fac-
tors does not conclusively establish fraudulent intent. Rather, they
are merely indicia of the debtor's subjective state of mind which
should be determined in light of all the relevant circumstances of
86. See Household Card Servs./Visa v. Vermillion (In re Vermillion), 136 B.R. 225, 226-
27 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Firsttier Bank v. Rush (In re Rush), 136 B.R. 999, 999 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1992); Signet Bank v. Borror (In re Borror), 132 B.R. 194, 196 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991); Household Bank v. Touchard (In re Touchard), 121 B.R. 397, 401 (Bankr. D. Utah
1990); Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc. v. Hinman (In re Hinman), 120 B.R. 1018, 1021 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1990); The May Co. v. Chech (In re Chech), 96 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988).
87. See Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank v. Cacho (In re Cacho), 137 B.R. 864, 866 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1991); Touchard, 121 B.R. at 401-02; Hinman, 120 B.R. at 1021; Notre Dame Fed.
Credit Union v. Tondreau (In re Tondreau), 117 B.R. 397, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989);
Williamsport Nat'l Bank v. Sutliff (In re Sutliff), 112 B.R. 680, 682-83 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1990).
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the case.""
The courts that eschew the "implied representation" doctrine
argue that it runs afoul of the requirement of actual fraud, and
would in essence allow a debt to be held nondischargeable based
on implied or constructive fraud. These courts reason that fraud is
not proven merely by showing a debtor's inability to repay.
Rather, the debtor must have the subjective intent not to repay at
the time the charge was made in order to sustain a finding of
nondischargeability8 9
G. NSF CHECK CASES
Another common fact pattern seen in § 523(aX2XA) dis-
chargeability cases is the situation where a debt results from pay-
ment with an NSF check. Once again, the courts are divided as to
the circumstances under which such debts are nondischargeable.
One line of cases holds that debts incurred through the issu-
ance of NSF checks are per se nondischargeable if the debtor knew
it did not have sufficient funds in its account to cover the check. 90
Courts espousing this position take the view that the delivery of a
check constitutes a representation that there are sufficient funds in
the account to cover the check.9 '
A somewhat more lenient rule is taken by courts that reason
that a debtor who issues a check knowing that his account has
insufficient funds but intending to deposit sufficient funds into his
account to cover the check is not acting with fraudulent intent.9 2
Absent additional circumstantial evidence establishing that the
debtor did not intend to cover the check, these courts hold that
the mere issuance of the check at a time when the account balance
was insufficient to cover the check does not result in nondis-
chargeability.93 While these courts agree that the issuance of a
check carries an implied representation, the representation is that
88. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Cirineo (In re Cirineo), 110 B.R. 754, 759
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
89. Citibank South Dakota v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653, 655-57 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1988); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Blackburn (In re Blackburn), 68 B.R. 870, 876-77
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724,
731-32 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985).
90. See Monarch Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 10 B.R. 296, 297-98
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); Altus Bank v. Stacey (In re Stacey), 105 B.R. 672, 675 (Bankr. S.D.
Ala. 1989).
91. Anderson, 10 B.R. at 297; Stacey, 105 B.R. at 675.
92. P & W Foreign Car Serv., Inc. v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 143 B.R. 51, 54 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1992); Jarboe Sales Co. v. Degraffenreid (In re Degraffenreid), 131 B.R. 178, 180
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991).
93. Edwards, 143 B.R. at 54-55.
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the debtor will cover the check, not that the account currently has
sufficient funds to pay for the purchase.94
A third position is taken by courts holding that the issuance of
an NSF check, without more, contains no implied representation
at all. These courts require an express representation by the
debtor that the check will be honored in order for the debt to be
nondischargeable.95
Once again, counsel must find out which position the forum
court espouses, and if the court has not ruled on the issue, counsel
should be prepared to argue the propriety of a particular
approach.
H. RECOVERY OF COSTS
A common problem in dischargeability proceedings is that
creditors may be tempted to file complaints in hopes of recouping
some of their losses through settlement with consumer debtors
who wish to avoid litigation costs. To discourage such filings,
§ 523(d) allows the consumer debtor to recover his or her attor-
ney's fees if the creditor's complaint in a § 523(aX2) case was not
substantially justified. The burden of establishing that the case was
substantially justified is on the creditor.96
The court's inquiry in this instance generally focuses on
whether the creditor's action was substantially justified as of the
time the complaint was filed, as opposed to whether the creditor
would have succeeded on the merits.9 7 This inquiry requires an
analysis of the creditor's review of its case prior to filing the com-
plaint, including the basis in truth for the facts alleged, the basis in
law for the theory advanced, and the connection between the facts
and law.9
While the focus is generally on the commencement of the
case, it has been held that the burden of establishing substantial
justification is essentially a "moving target." In other words, even
94. Id.
95. See Goldberg Sec., Inc. v. Scarlata (In re Scarlata), 127 B.R. 1004, 1009 (N.D. Ill.
1991), aff'd, 979 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1992); Microtech Int'l, Inc. v. Horwitz (In re Horwitz),
100 B.R. 395, 398-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
96. Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Smith (In re Smith), 107 B.R. 133, 134 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1989); Chrysler First Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Rhodes (In re Rhodes), 93 B.R. 622, 624-25 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1988).
97. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank v. Kullgren (In re Kullgren), 109 B.R. 949, 953 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1990); First Nat'l Bank v. Cloud (In re Cloud), 107 B.R. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989);
Smith, 107 B.R. at 134; Household Fin. Co. v. Beam (In re Beam), 73 B.R. 434, 438 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1987).
98. America First Credit Union v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 114 B.R. 291, 295 (Bankr. D. Utah
1990); Cloud, 107 B.R. at 159; Rhodes, 93 B.R. at 624-25; Beam, 73 B.R. at 438.
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if the original complaint can be substantially justified, an award of
fees against the creditor will still be proper if the creditor contin-
ues to pursue the case after learning that its position is no longer
justified.99
Section 523(d) places a premium on weighing the merits of
the case before a complaint is filed. Furthermore, creditor's coun-
sel should be aware that the court may impose an ongoing duty to
dismiss the case if it becomes apparent that the case is meritless.
V. DEBTS INCURRED THROUGH USE OF FALSE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS-§ 523(aX2XB)
Section 523(aX2XA) expressly excludes false representations
regarding a debtor's or insider's financial condition. Such debts
are dealt with instead by subsection (aX2XB) which excepts from
discharge debts that are obtained through the use of false written
financial statements.
A. ELEMENTS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The elements of proof for a case under § 523(aX2XB) are as
follows:
1. A debt was obtained by the use of a statement in
writing;
2. The financial statement was materially false;
3. The falsity concerns the debtor's financial condition;
4. The debtor made the statement with the intent to
deceive;
5. The creditor relied on the statement; and
6. The creditor's reliance was reasonable.100
As is the case under § 523(aX2XA), the standard of proof is the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, and the burden of proof is
on the complaining creditor.10 1
99. See Beneficial of Missouri, Inc. v. Shurbier (In re Shurbier), 134 B.R. 922, 928
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co. v. Hudgins, 72 B.R. 214, 221
(N.D. Ill. 1987).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XB) (1988). IT' Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Walz, 115 B.R. 353,
357 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Ruwart (In re Ruwart), 114 B.R. 725,
728 (D. Colo. 1990); NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Sofro (In re Rental Journal, Inc.), 111 B.R. 1012,
1015 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); First Seneca Bank v. Galizia (In re Galizia), 108 B.R. 63, 67
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Delano (In re Delano), 50 B.R. 613, 617
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Lambrakis v. Jones (In reJones), 49 B.R. 431,435 (Bankr. D.C. 1985).
101. Southwest Fin. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stratton (In re Stratton), 140 B.R. 720, 722
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); Codisco, Inc. v. Marx (In re Marx), 138 B.R. 633, 636 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1992); Groth v. Masegian (In re Masegian), 134 B.R. 402, 405 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991);
Fifth Third Bank v. Frugh (In re Frugh), 133 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991); Texas
Am. Bank v. Barron (In re Barron), 126 B.R. 255, 258 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
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B. THE WRITING REQUIREMENT
The first element of proof requires that a false financial state-
ment be in writing in order to give rise to nondischargeability. A
creditor who relies on a debtor's oral misrepresentation of its
financial wherewithal will not be entitled to a determination of
nondischargeability.
C. MATERIALITY
The second element of proof requires the misrepresentation
to be material in order to result in nondischargeability. The con-
cept of materiality in the context of § 523(aX2XB) has both objec-
tive and subjective elements, as observed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Jordan v. Southeast National Bank (In re Jor-
dan).'1 2 Objectively, a materially false statement is one that con-
tains substantial and important untruths regarding information of
the type which would normally affect the decision to grant
credit.10 3 Although not dispositive, a relevant subjective inquiry
used by courts in determining whether a statement is material is
whether the creditor would have extended credit had it known
the debtor's true situation.' 0 4
D. OMISSIONS
Unlike case law under § 523(aX2XA), there is no dispute that
omissions from written financial statements are sufficient to sustain
a finding of nondischargeability under § 523(aX2XB) if such omis-
sions are material.10 5 Thus, a failure to fully disclose assets or lia-
bilities can result in nondischargeability.
102. 927 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1991).
103. Jordan v. Southeast Nat'l Bank (In re Jordan), 927 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1991);
First Interstate Bank v. Greene (In re Greene), 96 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989);
Groth v. Masegian (In re Masegian), 134 B.R. 402, 405 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991); First Seneca
Bank v. Galizia (In re Galizia), 108 B.R. 63, 67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
104. Jordan, 927 F.2d at 224; Masegian, 134 B.R. at 405; Galizia, 108 B.R. at 67.
105. See Jordan, 927 F.2d at 224; Stratton, 140 B.R. at 722; Fifth Third Bank of Toledo
v. Frugh (In re Frugh), 133 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991); NCNB Nat'l Bank v.
Sofro (In re Rental Journal, Inc.), 111 B.R. 1012, 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); Galizia, 108
B.R. at 67. But see Lambrakis v. Jones (In re Jones), 49 B.R. 431, 436 (Bankr. D.C. 1985).
The portion of the Jones holding stating that omissions are insufficient under § 523(aX2XB)
appears to be an aberration and was not followed by the only court citing that part of the
holding. See North Shore Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jones (In re Jones), 88 B.R. 899, 903-04(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988). The holding is flawed because the only authority cited by theJones
court is Mercer v. Bailey, which was a § 523(aX2XA) case. Mercer v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 35
B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983). As noted in section IV(c) above, there is a split of opinion
under subsection (aX2XA).
[Vol. 69:57
1993] BANKRUPTCY FRAUD & NONDISCHARGEABILITY 77
E. INTENT
As is the case under § 523(aX2XA), the debtor must have made
the statement with an intention of deceiving the creditor.'
Although actual knowledge that the statement was false will satisfy
the intent requirement, it is sufficient to show that the creditor
acted with recklessness as to the truth or falsity of the state-
ment. 10 7 Thus, courts have found debts nondischargeable in cases
where the debtor has signed a loan application without reading
it. 10
8
Given the difficulty of proving the debtor's state of mind
through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
establish intent. 10 9 Debtor credibility is essential to override per-
suasive circumstantial evidence; therefore, debtor's counsel should
objectively determine his or her client's credibility.
F. RELIANCE
For a debt to be nondischargeable under § 523(aX2XB), the
creditor's reliance on the false financial statement must be both
actual and reasonable. 110 To establish actual reliance, the creditor
need only show that it did in fact subjectively rely on the financial
statement in extending credit to the debtor."' Even partial reli-
ance on the false statement is sufficient to find the debt nondis-
chargeable," 12 but the actual reliance element is missing if the
creditor relied solely on the debtor's past payment history, estab-
106. Signet Bank v. Wingo (In re Wingo), 113 B.R. 249, 251 (W.D. Va. 1989).
107. Southwest Fin. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stratton (In re Stratton), 140 B.R. 720, 723
(Bankr. N.D. I11. 1992); Groth v. Masegian (In re Masegian), 134 B.R. 402, 406 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1991); Fifth Third Bank of Toledo v. Frugh (In re Frugh), 133 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1991); Texas Am. Bank v. Barron (In re Barron), 126 B.R. 255, 260 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1991); Roster Corp. v. Fisackerly (In re Fisackerly), 114 B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1990); Galizia, 108 B.R. at 68.
108. See, e.g., In re Coughlin, 27 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1983).
109. Stratton, 140 B.R. at 723-24; Codisco, Inc. v. Marx (In re Marx), 138 B.R. 633, 636
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); Masegian, 134 B.R. at 406; Frugh, 133 B.R. at 875; Wingo, 113 B.R.
at 251; Galizia, 108 B.R. at 68.
110. First Am. Bank v. Schraw (In re Schraw), 136 B.R. 301,304 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992);
John Deere Co. v. Meyers (In re Meyers), 124 B.R. 735, 742 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991);
Founders Bank v. Moore (In re Moore), 118 B.R. 64, 65-66 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990);
Household Fin. Corp. v. Schoeff (In re Schoeff), 116 B.R. 119, 121 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990);
Wingo, 112 B.R. at 145; Horowitz Fin. Corp. v. Hall (In re Hall), 109 B.R. 149, 154 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1990); IFG Leasing Co. v. Vavra (In re Harms), 53 B.R. 134, 140-41 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1985).
111. FDIC v. Lafeve (In re Lafeve), 131 B.R. 604, 609 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1991);
Southeast Assoc. v. Jacobe (In re Jacobe), 121 B.R. 299, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); Moore,
118 B.R. at 65-66; Wingo, 112 B.R. at 145; Hall, 109 B.R. at 154.
112. Arkansas Aluminum Alloys, Inc. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 132 B.R. 436, 441 (D.
Kan. 1991); Texas Am. Bank v. Barron (In re Barron), 126 B.R. 255, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1991); Teachers Credit Union v. Johnson, 131 B.R. 848, 854-55 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Meyers,
124 B.R. at 742; Hall, 109 B.R. at 154.
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lished credit rating, or pledged collateral." 3
To establish reasonableness, the creditor must show that its
reliance was objectively reasonable as compared to the degree of
care that would be exercised by a reasonably cautious person in a
similar business transaction given (a) the particular circumstances
of the case, (b) the creditor's own business practices, and (c) the
standards and customs of the industry." 4 Certain creditor prac-
tices such as indicating that the debtor need not list all of its cur-
rent loan obligations, using truncated financial statements, failing
to follow the creditor's normal procedures, or ignoring independ-
ent knowledge of debtor's credit history may lead to a conclusion
that reliance on such statement was unreasonable."' A creditor
normally has no duty to conduct an independent investigation of
the debtor's credit history," 6 but where the financial statement
contains certain "red flags" which put the creditor on notice that
the statement is inaccurate, the creditor's reliance may be unrea-
sonable if the creditor fails to investigate further." 7
G. RECOVERY OF COSTS
Section 523(d), which allows for the recovery of costs where
the complaint is not substantially justified, is applicable to cases
under § 523(aX2XB) as well as under subsection (aX2XA). There-
fore, a successful debtor can recover its costs if the complaint was
not substantially justified, and there may be a continuing burden
on the creditor to dismiss the case if it becomes apparent that its
position lacks merit.
113. See Household Fin. Corp. v. Howard (In re Howard), 73 B.R. 694, 705-06 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1987) (citing numerous authorities); Standard Fed. Bank v. Compton (In re
Compton), 97 B.R. 970, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (quoting Howard, 73 B.R. 694);
Coughlin, 27 B.R. 632, 636 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1983).
114. Schraw, 136 B.R. at 304; Barron, 126 B.R. at 259; Jaress Truck Centers, Inc. v.
Hodges (In re Hodges), 116 B.R. 558, 561-62 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); Schoeff, 116 B.R. at
121; Horowitz Fin. Corp. v. Hall (In re Hall), 109 B.R. 149, 154 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990);
Harms, 53 B.R. at 140-41.
115. See Howard, 73 B.R. at 705-06; Compton, 97 B.R. at 978; Pacific Fin. Discount Co.
v. Whiting (In re Whiting), 10 B.R. 687, 689-90 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
116. Arkansas Aluminum Alloys, Inc. v. Joyner, (In re Joyner), 132 B.R. 436, 440-41
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991); Lafeve, 131 B.R. at 609; Meyers, 124 B.R. at 743; Hall, 109 B.R. at
154-55.
117. Teates v. Kuranda (In re Kuranda), 122 B.R. 264, 269 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990);
Moore, 118 B.R. at 66-67; Franklin State Bank v. Lippert (In re Lippert), 84 B.R. 612, 617
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); Beneficial of New York, Inc. v. Bossard (In re Bossard), 74 B.R. 730,
735 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); Oppenheimer v. Reder (In re Reder), 60 B.R. 529, 538 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1986).
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VI. DEBTS FOR FRAUD OR DEFALCATION BY
FIDUCIARIES-§ 523(AX4)
Section 523(aX4) excepts from discharge debts for "fraud or
defalcation while [the debtor is] acting in a fiduciary capacity,
embezzlement or larceny."' 8  By its own terms, this section
makes debts for fraud or defalcation nondischargeable only if the
debtor was acting as a fiduciary. Debts for larceny and embezzle-
ment, in contrast, are nondischargeable regardless of the debtor's
fiduciary status.
This section will be limited to analysis of the so-called "fiduci-
ary debts," while the nonfiduciary debts will be discussed in sec-
tion VII below.
A. FIDUCIARY CAPACITY
The type of fiduciary relationship contemplated by § 523(aX4)
is strictly that of an express or technical trustee; i.e. the trust rela-
tionship must be created either by an express agreement between
the parties, or by the operation of state or federal law. Construc-
tive and implied trusts, and trusts ex maleficio, which arise based
on equitable principles are insufficient under § 523(aX4 ). Since
trusts ex maleficio are not sufficient, the trust must be one which
arises independently of, and without reference to, the act which
gives rise to the debt.11 9
Normal commercial relationships such as debtor/creditor,
principal/agent, bailor/bailee, and broker/client do not by them-
selves give rise to the type of fiduciary duty contemplated by
§ 523(aX4). 20 However, through operation of state or federal law,
the duties of a technical trustee can be imposed upon a party
based on such party's relationship with others. If such fiduciary
capacity exists between the debtor and a creditor, the fiduciary
118. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX4) (1988).
119. LSP Inv. Partnership v. Bennett .(In re Bennett), 970 F.2d 138, 142-43 (5th Cir.
1992); Woodworking Enter., Inc. v. Baird (In re Baird), 114 B.R. 198, 202 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1990); Farina v. Balzano (In re Balzano), 127 B.R. 524, 532 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991); Beebe v.
Schwenn (In re Schwenn), 126 B.R. 351, 352 (D. Colo. 1991); San Saba Pecan, Inc. v. Failing
(In re Failing), 124 B.R. 340, 344 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Fox v. Shervin (In re Shervin), 112 B.R.
724, 730-31 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); Coronet Ins. Co. v. Blumberg (In re Blumberg), 112 B.R.
236, 240 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); Hayton v. Eichelberger (In re Eichelberger), 100 B.R. 861,
863-64 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989); American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Weber (In re Weber), 99 B.R.
1001, 1008-09 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989); United Am. Ins. Co. v. Koelfgen (In re Koelfgen), 87
B.R. 993, 996 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
120. Byber v. Geer (In re Geer), 137 B.R. 37, 40-41 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); Moore v.
McQueen (In re McQueen), 102 B.R. 120, 124 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Leeb v. Guy (In re
Guy), 101 B.R. 961, 983 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); Sager v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 94 B.R. 406,
410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
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requirement of § 523(aX4) is satisfied.121 The types of parties upon
whom such fiduciary duties are imposed will therefore vary from
state to state. The following commercial entities have been found
to carry fiduciary obligations sufficient to satisfy § 523(aX4) based
on state or federal law: bank directors; 122 securities and commodi-
ties brokers; 23 escrowees; 2 4 insurance agents;125 real estate licen-
sees; 126 and public treasurers. 127 Corporate officers'duties to their
corporations are generally held to satisfy the fiduciary capacity
requirement,22 but their duties to creditors probably are not suffi-
cient to satisfy § 523(aX4) unless the corporation is either insolvent
or in bankruptcy. 29
The question of whether the state law duties imposed on part-
ners rise to the level contemplated by § 523(aX4) is one that has
caused courts much difficulty. The courts are fairly evenly split on
the issue of whether partners in a general partnership owe a suffi-
cient duty to each other to render debts for fraud or defalcation
nondischargeable.130 A stronger case for imposing fiduciary duties
121. Bennett, 970 F.2d at 143; Baird, 114 B.R. at 202; Schwenn, 126 B.R. at 352-53;
Blashke v. Standard (In re Standard), 123 B.R. 444, 453 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); Blumberg,
112 B.R. at 240-41; Guy, 101 B.R. at 983. See also Bakis v. Snyder (In re Snyder), 101 B.R.
822, 835 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Weber, 99 B.R. at 1009.
122. See First Nat'l Bank v. Thurman (In re Thurman), 121 B.R. 888, 889-90 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1990); FDIC v. Sax (In re Sax), 106 B.R. 534, 538-39 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
123. See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Sawyer (In re Sawyer), 112 B.R. 386, 389-91 (D.
Colo. 1990); Lock v. Scheuer (In re Scheuer), 125 B.R. 584, 592-93 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
124. See, e.g., Stone v. Feldman (In re Feldman), 111 B.R. 481, 486 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1990).
125. See Blumberg, 112 B.R. at 241-42; Graves v. James (In re James), 94 B.R. 350, 352-
53 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). But see Rocky Mountain Gen. Agency v. Rustad (In re Rustad),
110 B.R. 928, 931 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
126. See, e.g., Woosley v. Edwards (In re Woosley), 117 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1990).
127. See, e.g., Crooksville Exempted Village School Dist. v. Curth (In re Curth), 98 B.R.
324, 327 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
128. See Bell v. Collins (In re Collins), 137 B.R. 754, 756 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992);
LaPointe v. Brown (In re Brown), 131 B.R. 900, 904 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); Thurman, 121
B.R. at 889; Cutter Realty Group, Inc. v. Schiraldi (In re Schiraldi), 116 B.R. 359, 361-62
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); Pan-Western Life Ins. Co. v. Galbreath (In re Galbreath), 112 B.R.
892, 898-900 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Snyder, 101 B.R. at 835.
129. See Krug, Inc. v. Nayee (In re Nayee), 99 B.R. 90, 92 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989);
American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Weber (In re Weber), 99 B.R. 1001, 1009 (Bankr. D. Utah
1989); Bay 511 Corp. v. Thorsen (In re Thorsen), 98 B.R. 527, 529 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
130. Compare Roy v. Gravel, 143 B.R. 825, 828-29 (W.D. La. 1992) (finding that a
partnership relationship is sufficient under § 523(aX4)); Longo v. McLaren (In re McLaren),
136 B.R. 705, 714 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (finding that a partnership relationship is
sufficient under § 523(aX4)); Walters v. Sawyer (In re Sawyer), 130 B.R. 384, 396-97 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that a partnership relationship is sufficient under § 523(aX4)); Beebe
v. Schwenn (In re Schwenn), 126 B.R. 351, 353 (D. Colo. 1991) (finding that a partnership
relationship is sufficient under § 5 2 3 (aX4 )); Getaz v. Stewart (In re Stewart), 123 B.R. 817,
820 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding that a partnership relationship is sufficient under
§ 523(aX4)); Tindale v. Blatnik (In re Blatnik), 101 B.R. 718 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989) (finding
that partnership relationship is sufficient under § 523(aX4)); with Rolley v. Spector (In re
Spector), 133 B.R. 733, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that a partnership relationship is
insufficient under § 523(aX4)); Blashke v. Standard (In re Standard), 123 B.R. 444, 451-52
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in this context can be made with respect to a managing partner of
a limited partnership, who has complete control of the financial
operations of the partnership, since such a partner has a height-
ened fiduciary duty. However, there is not complete consensus on
this issue.1 3 1 Ultimately, these are questions of interpreting the
standards imposed by state partnership law.
An interesting question is posed when the managing partner
of a limited partnership is either a corporation or another partner-
ship. Clearly the fiduciary duties of the individual controlling the
managing partner extend only to that partnership or corporation.
Such an individual has no fiduciary obligations with respect to the
limited partners.'3 2 However, at least one court has signalled a
willingness to pierce the veil of the corporate managing partner to
reach the individual ultimately responsible for operating the busi-
ness if such individual is virtually indistinguishable from the man-
aging partner, and he or she operated the corporate managing
partner for his or her sole benefit.13 3
The issue of fiduciary capacity is largely determined on a case-
by-case basis. Counsel should usually be prepared to argue the
issue of whether fiduciary capacity exists, especially in partnership
cases. It is important, however, to bear in mind the fundamental
requirement that counsel must be able to point to a specific agree-
ment or statute that gives rise to the fiduciary relationship.
B. INTENT
In addition to fiduciary capacity, the creditor must also prove
fraud or defalcation in a § 523(aX4) claim. The intent elements for
fraud and defalcation are very different.
1. Fraud
As is the case under § 523(aX2), the type of fraud that the
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (finding that a partnership relationship is insufficient under
§ 523(aX4)); Sulphur Partnership v. Piscioneri, 108 B.R. 595, 601-02 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989)
(finding that a partnership relationship is insufficient under § 523(aX4)); Kunzler v. Bundy
(In re Bundy), 95 B.R. 1004, 1012-13 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (finding that a partnership
relationship is insufficient under § 523(aX4)); Sager v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 94 B.R. 406, 410
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (finding that partnership relationship is insufficient under
§ 523(aX4)).
131. Compare LSP Inv. Partnership v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 970 F.2d 138, 149 (5th
Cir. 1992); Selenske v. Selenske (In re Selenske), 103 B.R. 200, 202-04 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1989); Leeb v. Guy (In re Guy), 101 B.R. 961, 990-91 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); Arnett v.
Weiner (In re Weiner), 95 B.R. 204, 206-07 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989); with Hardesty v. Johnson,
126 B.R. 343, 346 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
132. Bennett, 970 F.2d at 149; Medved v. Novak (In re Novak), 97 B.R. 47, 59 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1987).
133. See Park v. Moorad (In re Moorad), 132 B.R. 58, 62 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991).
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creditor must establish is actual or positive fraud. Such fraud
involves moral turpitude or intentional wrongdoing. Once again,
implied or constructive fraud that exists without any bad faith or
immorality is insufficient.13 4
The evidentiary problems in connection with proving intent,
discussed with respect to § 52 3(aX2) arise with equal force in
§ 523(aX4) fiduciary fraud cases. Circumstantial evidence and wit-
ness credibility will be the deciding factors in the case.
2. Defalcation
To prove defalcation is a far simpler matter than proving
fraud. Defalcation is a broader concept than fraud, subsuming
even embezzlement and misappropriation. To establish defalca-
tion, all the plaintiff must show is that the fiduciary failed to
account for money entrusted to him or her.135 Even negligent or
innocent defaults where the fiduciary acted in good faith can con-
stitute defalcation.136 Furthermore, it is not even necessary that
the fiduciary be fully aware of its duties as such.'3 7 Nor is it neces-
sary that the fiduciary personally benefit from its acts.' 31
Given the ease of proving defalcation as opposed to fraud,
counsel should be very explicit regarding which type of fiduciary
debt he or she is pursuing and which state of mind he or she
intends to prove. If counsel is attempting to prove fraud, it is
advisable to take an objective look at the client's credibility and
the implications that can be drawn from the circumstances of the
134. Lawrence Steel Erection Co. v. Piercy (In re Piercy), 140 B.R. 108, 114 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1992); American Home Assurance Co. v. Katzen (In re Katzen), 47 B.R. 738, 742(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Allentown Supply Co. v. McCurdy (In re McCurdy), 45 B.R. 728,731(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985); REL Commercial Corp. v. Materetsky (In re Materetsky), 28 B.R.
499, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
135. Woodworking Enter., Inc. v. Baird (In re Baird), 114 B.R. 198, 204 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1990); Hoff v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 140 B.R. 313, 316 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); Boudakian v.
Boudakian (In re Boudakian), 137 B.R. 89, 94 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992); Hall v. Johann (In re
Johann), 125 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); Bamco 18 v. Reeves (In re Reeves), 124
B.R. 5, 6, 8-9 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); San Saba Pecan, Inc. v. Failing (In re Failing), 124 B.R.
340, 344 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Pisoni v. Hodges (In re Hodges), 115 B.R. 152, 155 (Bankr. S.D.
Ill. 1990); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Manzo (In re Manzo), 106 B.R. 69, 72 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1989); FDIC v. Sax (In re Sax), 106 B.R. 534, 539 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); American Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Weber (In re Weber), 99 B.R. 1001, 1012-13 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989).
136. Baird, 114 B.R. at 204; Carroll, 140 B.R. at 316; LaPointe v. Brown (In re Brown),
131 B.R. 900, 904 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 127 B.R.
440, 443 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991); Reeves, 124 B.R. at 6, 8-9; Failing, 124 B.R. at 344; Hodges,
115 B.R. at 155; Manzo, 106 B.R. at 72; Hayton v. Eichelberger (In re Eichelberger), 100
B.R. 861, 866 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kern (In re Kern), 98 B.R.
321, 324 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
137. Kern, 98 B.R. at 323.
138. Boudakian, 137 B.R. at 94; Failing, 124 B.R. at 344; Manzo, 106 B.R. at 72;
Eichelberger, 100 B.R. at 866.
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case. Debtor credibility will be less of an issue in proving defalca-
tion since even innocent defaults are sufficient.
C. STANDARD OF PROOF
The standard of proof for all debts under § 523(aX4), including
embezzlement and larceny discussed below, appears to be the
preponderance standard, based on the Supreme Court's holding in
Grogan v. Garner.139
VII. DEBTS FOR EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY
In addition to the fiduciary debts, § 523(aX4) also excludes
debts for embezzlement and larceny. No fiduciary duty need be
shown to sustain a finding of nondischargeability for larceny or
embezzlement. 1
40
The elements of proof for nondischargeability based on
embezzlement are:
1. The creditor's property was entrusted to the debtor;
2. The debtor appropriated the property or used it for a
purpose other than that for which it was entrusted;
and
3. The debtor acted with fraudulent intent.
1 41
The elements of proof for nondischargeability based on lar-
ceny are:
1. The debtor fraudulently and wrongfully took prop-
erty from its rightful owner;
2. The debtor intended to convert the property to his or
her own use; and
139. 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991). See also Kaye v. Rose (In re Rose), 934 F.2d 901, 904
(7th Cir. 1991); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Butts (In re Butts), 142 B.R. 1011, 1012 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1992); Cavalier Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Rico (In re Rico), 133 B.R. 880, 881 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1991); Gravel v. Roy, (In re Roy), 130 B.R. 214,217 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1991). However,
as discussed in section VIII, infra, the Supreme Court's holding in Grogan is dicta as it
applies to sections other than subsection (aX2XA), so courts could entertain arguments that a
clear and convincing standard should apply in subsection (aX4) cases.
140. First Nat'l Bank v. Henson (In re Henson), 135 B.R. 346, 349 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1991); Farina v. Balzano (In re Balzano), 127 B.R. 524, 532 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991);
American Nat'l Bank v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 125 B.R. 777, 780 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991);
Fox v. Shervin (In re Shervin), 112 B.R. 724, 735 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); Rech v. Burgess (In
re Burgess), 106 B.R. 612, 621 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
141. See Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 942 F.2d
551,555 (9th Cir. 1991); Rico, 133 B.R. at 881; RAI Credit Corp. v. Patton (In re Patton), 129
B.R. 113, 116 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); Balzano, 127 B.R. at 532-33; Burgess, 106 B.R. at
621; Coleman v. Choisnard (In re Choisnard), 98 B.R. 37, 41 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989);
United Am. Ins. Co. v. Koelfgen (In re Koelfgen), 87 B.R. 993, 997 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
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3. The owner did not consent to such conversion. 142
The elements of proof for both embezzlement and larceny
have their roots in common law, and are similar to the definitions
used by most state statutes.' 43 However, if there is any conflict,
the elements listed above prevail in proceedings under
§ 523(aX4). 141
Fraudulent intent is a necessary element to the establishment
of both embezzlement and larceny. Once again, the plaintiff must
prove actual or positive fraud involving moral turpitude or inten-
tional wrong. 145
VIII. DEBTS FOR WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURIES-
§ 523(aX6)
Section 523(aX6) excludes from discharge debts for "willful
and malicious" injury to the creditor or its property. 146 Proof of
fraud is not necessary to establish grounds for relief under
§ 52 3(aX6), but a thorough understanding of this section is neces-
sary since requests for relief under § 523(aX6) are often coupled
with requests for relief for fraud under subsections 523(aX2) and
(aX4).
A. STANDARD OF PROOF
Several courts hold that the Supreme Court's holding in Gro-
gan v. Garner14 7 is broad enough to establish the preponderance
of the evidence standard of proof as the proper standard in all dis-
chargeability cases under § 523(a), including subsection (aX6).1 48
However, the precise issue before the Supreme Court in Grogan
was which standard should be applied in § 523(aX2XA) cases;
therefore, the Court's holding is dicta regarding the standard of
proof to be applied to the other subsections. At least one court
142. See Balzano, 127 B.R. at 532; Weinreich v. Langworthy (In re Langworthy), 121
B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Burgess, 106 B.R. at 622; Choisnard, 98 B.R. at 41.
143. Kaye v. Rose (In re Rose), 934 F.2d 901, 903 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991); Langworthy, 121
B.R. at 907; Doran Services, Inc. v. Valentine (In re Valentine), 104 B.R. 67, 71 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1988).
144. Gillespi v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 110 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
145. Tague & Beem, P.C. v. Tague (In re Tague), 137 B.R. 495, 500 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1991); Bernstein v. Moran (In re Moran), 107 B.R. 359, 361 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 5 2 3 (aX6) (1988).
147. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
148. See Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 942 F.2d
551, 554 (9th Cir. 1991); Hoskins v. Yanks (In re Yanks), 931 F.2d 42, 43 (11th Cir. 1991);
Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 1991); Night Kitchen Music v.
Pineau (In re Pineau), 141 B.R. 522, 526 & n.17 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992); Wood Peak v.
Mazander (In re Mazander), 130 B.R. 534,536 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991); Bartlett Futures, Inc.
v. Davis (In re Davis), 124 B.R. 831, 833 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991).
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recently has applied the clear and convincing standard of proof in
§ 523(aX6) cases, finding the Supreme Court's reasoning in Grogan
to be inapplicable to dischargeability cases not dealing with
fraud. 149
Counsel therefore should be prepared to argue the appropri-
ate standard of proof if the forum court has not ruled on the issue,
and to face differing standards of proof in some fraud dis-
chargeability proceedings.
B. INTENT
In order to prove a case under subsection (aX6), the creditor
must establish that its injury was proximately caused by acts of the
debtor, and that the debtor's acts were both willful and malicious.
The term "willful" merely means that the debtor's act was deliber-
ate or intentional. 150 Negligent or reckless acts will not support a
finding of nondischargeability under § 523(aX6).' 5 ' The term
"malicious" means that the debtor acted with knowledge that its
actions were certain, or substantially certain, to cause injury with-
out just cause.' 52 Actual hatred, spite, or ill will are not necessary
to establish maliciousness. 53
C. NATURE OF INJURY TO CREDITOR
Section 52 3(aX6) applies to many types of injuries, most of
which are irrelevant to a discussion of dischargeability as a remedy
for fraud. However, in connection with fraud cases under subsec-
tions 52 3(aX2 ) and (aX4), allegations that a creditor was injured by
the conversion or disposition of its collateral are not uncommon.
149. Tague, 137 B.R. at 504-05. The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Florida has also applied the clear and convincing standard in Sjostedt v. Salmon, reasoning
that it was bound to do so by an earlier Eleventh Circuit opinion. Sjostedt v. Salmon (In re
Salmon), 128 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). However, Salmon appears to be in
conflict with Hoskins v. Yanks (In re Yanks), 931 F.2d 42 (11th Cir. 1991), not cited by the
Salmon court, and decided by the Eleventh Circuit only one month earlier.
150. C.I.T. Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Posta (In re Posta), 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1989);
Tague, 137 B.R. at 502; Sun Bank v. Moore (In re Moore), 136 B.R. 570, 572 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1991); Sylvester v. Martin (In re Martin), 130 B.R. 930, 947 (Bankr. N.D. IU. 1991); Blashke v.
Standard (In re Standard), 123 B.R. 444, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
151. Moore, 136 B.R. at 572; Martin, 130 B.R. at 947; McGee v. McCown (In re
McCown), 129 B.R. 432, 438 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); Standard, 123 B.R. at 449; Chemical
Bank v. Neman (In re Neman), 119 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
152. Britton v. Price (In re Britton), 950 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1991); Vulcan Coals,
Inc. v. Howard, 946 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 (6th Cir. 1991); Posta, 866 F.2d at 367; Tague &
Beem v. Tague (In re Tague), 137 B.R. 495, 502 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); Moore, 136 B.R. at
572; Edgman v. Farfalla (In re Farfalla), 132 B.R. 628, 630 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1991); Martin,
130 B.R. at 947; Standard, 123 B.R. at 449.
153. Howard, 946 F.2d at 1228-29; Moore, 136 B.R. at 572; Martin, 130 B.R. at 947;
Standard, 123 B.R. at 449; Rolland v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 109 B.R. 885, 892 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1989).
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Such injuries have been found to be eligible for redress under
§ 523(aX6) in cases in which the conversion or disposition was will-
ful and malicious. 154
IX. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS
A. Do not commence a case for fraud under § 523 or § 727
lightheartedly; § 523 cases are difficult to prove, and § 727 cases
are even harder.
B. Consider the economics of the case. A dischargeability
case is full-fledged litigation. Consider the chances of collecting on
any judgment obtained.
C. Do not couple a § 523 action with a § 727 action if the
only desired relief is a declaration of nondischargeability of a par-
ticular debt. Consider the client's goals and interests. If a success-
ful challenge to dischargeability of a specific debt can be made,
there is probably little interest in allowing other creditors to pur-
sue the debtor for collection of their debts.
D. Remember that actual or positive fraud must be proven
in most cases. Be prepared for the debtor's defense: "I did it, but
it was an honest mistake and I didn't mean to mislead the credi-
tor" or "I sold the collateral, but I did it to save the business, not to
injure the creditor." Circumstantial evidence is almost always
necessary to prove intent, and the best kind of circumstantial evi-
dence is documentary.
E. Reassess the case as it progresses. If it appears that there
is a good chance the creditor will lose, the creditor could wind up
being responsible for the debtor's costs and expenses under
§ 523(d).
F. Recognize the very factual nature of dischargeability pro-
ceedings. A decision regarding fraud almost always turns on the
weight given to the evidence presented by each side, so reversals
on appeal are rare.
G. Understand that court files in adversary proceedings are
separate files from those maintained in the main bankruptcy case.
Thus, any evidence from the main case file that a party wishes the
court to consider must be introduced into evidence at the trial of
the adversary proceeding. Judicial notice of the main case file will
not get the substantive content of documents from that file into
154. See Friendly Fin. Serv. Mid-City, Inc. v. Modicue (In re Modicue), 926 F.2d 452,
453 (5th Cir. 1991); Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. James (In re James), 124 B.R.
614, 616 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); St. Luke's Hosps. of Fargo, Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith), 119
B.R. 714, 721 n.2 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990).
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evidence because the only facts that are subject to judicial notice
are facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute" or that are
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."'11 5 Thus, only
facts such as when a document was filed, or whether it was filed at
all, are subject to judicial notice.
H. Have all evidentiary objections in mind prior to the trial.
Factual stipulations, stipulations as to admissibility of evidence,
and clearly stated objections to admissibility make dischargeabiity
trials proceed much more smoothly. The bankruptcy courts use
and apply the Federal Rules of Evidence.
I. Know the judge and the court. Do not assume that trying
a case in bankruptcy court is just like trying a case in state court.
Most bankruptcy courts have detailed local rules because of the
volume of litigation they process. Tripping-up on a particular local
rule can be fatal to the case. Also, different judges have distinctly
different "smell tests" when it comes to judging fraud. If counsel
has not appeared in bankruptcy court before a particular judge,
ask around-a lot could be learned.
J. Remember that bankruptcy judges try many dis-
chargeability cases and quite a few discharge cases. They have
heard most anything the creditor can say about reliance or the
debtor can say about intent to defraud. It is important, therefore,
to realistically assess the believability of witnesses vis-a-vis the
opposing party's witness. If counsel doesn't find his or her witness
convincing, the strength of counsel's case should be reconsidered.
K. Be prepared to conduct discovery on a shorter deadline
than usual. Bankruptcy judges often want to move dis-
chargeability cases to trial very quickly to accommodate the public
policy of providing a discharge swiftly. It is not at all unusual to try
the case within five to six months of filing.
L. Debtor's counsel should be wary of bringing counter-
claims against the plaintiff. Often such counterclaims are estate
property because they arise from pre-petition events and must
therefore be commenced by the trustee.
X. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code abhors debtor fraud, and thus the cred-
itor is given powerful remedies to redress such fraud through the
denial of the fundamental elements of debtor relief afforded by
155. FED. R. EvID. 201.
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the Code. However, these remedies are provided in light of the
Bankruptcy Code's central purpose of providing a "procedure by
which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make
peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life
with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt.'"156 Therefore, bank-
ruptcy courts require strict creditor compliance with both the pro-
cedural and substantive requirements for obtaining a
determination of nondischargeability. Familiarity with such
requirements is thus fundamental to effective representation of
both creditors and debtors where allegations of debtor fraud arise.
156. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
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APPENDIX
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
§ 523. Exceptions to discharge
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal,
or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an
insider's financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is lia-
ble for such money, property, services, or credit reason-
ably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published
with intent to deceive; or
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,
consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating
more than $500 for "luxury goods or services" incurred by an
individual debtor on or within forty days before the order for
relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than
$1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open
end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within
twenty days before the order for relief under this title, are
presumed to be nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services"
do not include goods or services reasonably acquired for the
support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; an extension of consumer credit under an open end
credit plan is to be defined for purposes of this subparagraph
as it is defined in the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.);
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of
this title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor
to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit-
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(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4),
or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and
timely request for a determination of dischargeability of such
debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had
notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely
filing and request;
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity;
(cX1) Except as provided in subsection (aX3XB) of this sec-
tion, the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified
in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, unless,
on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after
notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be
excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the
case may be, of subsection (a) of this section.
(d) If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability
of a consumer debt under subsection (aX2) of this section, and such
debt is discharged, the court shall grant judgment in favor of the
debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the pro-
ceeding if the court finds that the position of the creditor was not
substantially justified, except that the court shall not award such
costs and fees if special circumstances would make the award
unjust.
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007
(c) Time for Filing Complaint Under § 523(c) in Chapter 7
Liquidation, Chapter 11 Reorganization, and Chapter 12 Family
Farmer's Debt Adjustment Cases; Notice of Time Fixed.
A complaint to determine the dischargeability of any debt
pursuant to § 523(c) of the Code shall be filed not later than 60
days following the first date set for the meeting of creditors held
pursuant to § 341(a). The court shall give all creditors not less than
30 days notice of the time so fixed in the manner provided in Rule
2002. On motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice,
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the court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivi-
sion. The motion shall be made before the time has expired.
(d) Time for Filing Complaint Under § 523(c) in Chapter 13
Individual's Debt Adjustment Cases; Notice of Time Fixed.
On motion by a debtor for a discharge under § 1328(b), the
court shall enter an order fixing a time for the filing of a complaint
to determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to § 523(c)
and shall give not less than 30 days notice of the time fixed to all
creditors in the manner provided in Rule 2002. On motion of any
party in interest after hearing on notice the court may for cause
extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion shall be
made before the time has expired.
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7041
Rule 41 F.R.Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings, except
that a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance without notice to the trustee,
the United States trustee, and such other persons as the court may
direct, and only on order of the court containing terms and condi-
tions which the court deems proper.
District of Minnesota Local Bankruptcy Rule 1110
A complaint objecting to discharge or seeking revocation of
discharge shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance except
by order of the court after hearing on motion made in the adver-
sary proceeding. The plaintiff shall serve the motion on all credi-
tors and other parties in interest. The plaintiff also shall file an
affidavit stating that nothing has been received by or promised to
the plaintiff in consideration of the request for dismissal.

